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Mr. Ball
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November 16, 1962

TO: The Secretary
U - Mr. Ball ✓
G - Mr. Johnson

THROUGH: S/S *[Signature]*

FROM: S/P - W. W. Rostow

SUBJECT: Current Negotiations.

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 6/10/77
PER SP/... OFFICE EUR
FADRC FOI CASE NO. 620289 Burnburn

Reviewing the current negotiations at a middle distance -- without all the communications available -- I have, nevertheless, two observations which I should like to pass along:

1. The Soviets are not merely trying to salvage the Communist revolution in Cuba from this operation, they are trying to salvage, in dilute form, another asset which they would have achieved if we had accepted Soviet missiles in Cuba; that is, the legitimacy of a Soviet interest in the affairs of Latin America and a breaking up of the concept of the Hemisphere as a self-contained security unit. Unless we are very stiff-backed, indeed, we shall end up with the Latin American states feeling that, via these negotiations and the UN's role in Latin America, we have diluted the Hemispheric concept and accepted the fact that the Soviet Union has a long-run role of influence in the Western Hemisphere. In the light of this prospect, it seems to me essential at some early stage that the integrity of the OAS, the legitimacy of the OAS basis for our position with respect to Cuba, and the continuing role of the OAS in this crisis be strongly reasserted.

2. Fresh from an intensive confrontation with a wide range of our citizens in Detroit, I would underline this aspect of the negotiation: if we have any chance of gaining

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public backing for disarmament or other negotiations with the Soviet Union in the relatively near -- or perhaps even foreseeable -- future, the Cuban matter must be ended cleanly in line with the exchange of letters between the President and Khrushchev. There is latent in public feeling the question: How can we ever negotiate with these people again or trust them? If the present negotiations are not cleanly resolved, this public anxiety will surely be heightened by political attacks from the opposition, and efforts to exploit any give in Moscow on larger issues will be hampered. I believe this aspect of the problem should not only influence our own policy but should be communicated candidly to Khrushchev.

Copy to: EUR - Mr. William Tyler
ARA - Mr. Edwin Martin

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